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Abstract
A small contingent of engineersat NASA Lewis
Research Center pioneered in basic researchon liquid
propellantsfor rockets shortly after World War II.
Carried on through the 1950s,thiswork influencedthe
important earlydecisionsmade by Abe Silversteinwhen
he took charge of the Officeof Space FlightPrograms
for NASA. He strongly supported the development of
liquid hydrogen as a propulsion fuel in the face of
resistancefrom Wernher yon Braun. Members of the
Lewis staffplayed an important rolein bringing liquid
hydrogen technology to the point ofreliabilitythrough
theirmanagement ofthe Centaur Program. This paper
demonstrateshow the personalityand engineeringintui-
tionof Abe Silversteinshaped the Centaur program and
lefta lastingimprint on the laboratoryresearchtradi-
tion. Many of the current leadersof Lewis Research
Center receivedtheirIn'sthands-on engineeringexperi-
ence when they worked on the Centaur program in the
1960s.
Introduction
Too oftenwe forgetthe human element inthe crea-
tion of technology. Laboratory research traditions,
nurtured over a periodofmany years,aswell as leader-
ship axe required to bring a complex technology to a
pointwhere itcan be reliablyused. In the development
ofliquidhydrogen asa propulsionfuel,both the labora-
tory researchtraditionand the visionofAbe Silverstein
played a centralrole in encouraging basicresearch on
liquidfuelsduring the 1950s at the NACA Lewis Flight
Propulsion Laboratory. Silverstein's background in
liquid hydrogen technology built at Lewis over a decade
gave him confidence to champion the cause of liquid
hydrogen in the face of strong arguments for conven-
tional kerosene-based fuels. The success of the Centaur
Program managed at Lewis proved his faith in liquid
hydrogen. It also demonstrated the ability of men with
backgrounds in laboratory research to manage large
development programs.
Early Liquid Hydrogen Research at Lewis
Research on rocket fuels began at Lewis Laboratory
during World War II. Late in the war, members of the
Fuels and Lubricants Division carried out tests of solid
propellants in four hastily constructed test stands.
Although this work was officially terminated in 1945,
research in rocket propulsion continued despite lack of
official sanction. Members of the small rocket section,
impressed by the V-2, studied German technical papers
as well as those produced by the group under Frank
Malina at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. They decided
to focus their investigations on the least studied area:
that of liquid propellants. By 1948, they had calculated
the performance of a number of high energy fuels. They
concluded that liquid hydrogen held greatest promise
because of its high specific impulse. 1
Commitment to liquid hydrogen among rocket
pioneers had an impressive history. Konstantin
Tsiolkovsky had recommended it as a rocket fuel in his
"Treatise on Space Travel" in 1903. Hermann Oberth
and Robert Goddard had also discussed its potential. In
the United States a group at Ohio State University
tested a rocket fueled by liquid hydrogen as early as
1945. But the technical problems in developing a rocket
fueled by liquid hydrogen were formidable. Without
laboratory facilities and a dependable supply, the study
of liquid hydrogen had to be passed over in favor of
fuels like hydrazine to be used with oxidizers like hydro-
gen peroxide, chlorine trifluoride, liquid oxygen, nitrogen
tetroxide, and liquid fluorine. 2
This situation began to change when Abe
Silverstein became Chief of Research in 1949. He
allowed the new rocket branch within the Fuels and
Combustion Division more responsibility and visibility.
He encouraged the group to establish criteria for propel-
lant selection. The group was frustrated by their inabil-
ity to verify their predictions by experiment.
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In 1951, possibly in response to intelligence reports
of Russian advances in rocketry, the NACA authorized
a formal Subcommittee on Rocket Engines within the
Power Plants Committee. That same year Lewis
Laboratory received its first formal appropriation for
rocket research. However, the staff assigned to the
rocket branch remained less than 3 percent of the
laboratory's personnel. Experimental facilities, now
supplemented by four larger test cells paid for out of
laboratory operating funds, remained inadequate.
The following year the NACA rocket engine sub-
committee, chaired by Maurice Zucrow, prodded the
slow moving NACA headquarters to support funding of
a $2.5 million rocket propulsion laboratory for high-
energy propellants, completed at Lewis in 1957. In 1952
the laboratory also purchased a hydrogen liquifier. By
1954, the rocket branch had developed the nation's in'st
regeneratively cooled liquid hydrogen-liquid fluorine
rocket with 5000 pounds of thrust.
However, the real breakthrough in terms of support
came unexpectedly from aeronautics. The Air Force,
interested in liquid hydrogen to fuel turbojet engines for
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, funded an experi-
mental test program at Lewis Laboratory called Project
Bee.
This was exactly the kind of hands-on engineering
project that Silverstien found most challenging. At last
the work in high-energy propellartts had gained full
command of his attention. The project staff modified a
B-57B bomber equipped with two Curtiss Wright J-65
engines so that one engine could burn either jet fuel or
hydrogen. After extensive ground testing of the hydro-
gen system, it was flight tested over Lake Erie. The
program resolved the questions of insulation, structure,
and pumping of liquid hydrogen in flight.
Project Bee validated the work of the rocket
branch. They received important experience in the
handling and storage of liquid hydrogen that would later
prove crucial when the laboratory later took charge of
the development of the Centaur rocket. Silverstein, with
Eldon Hall, wrote the final report: "Liquid Hydrogen as
a Jet Fuel for High-Altitude Aircraft. "°
The Gathering Momentum of Space-Related Research
In spring of 1957, the staff began to plan for a fall
conference to evaluate propulsion systems. Proponents
of space-related research urged Silverstein to allow them
to include sessions on space flight and space propulsion
systems, as well as more conventional systems such a
turbojets and ramjets. Silverstein agreed to give them
one afternoon session. With the imagination of many
staffnow sparked, research groups worked up sessions on
liquid hydrogen, nuclear rockets, and space power
systems.
The tension between the foot-dragging of NACA
Headquarters and the gathering momentum of the
Cleveland laboratory toward space-related research
mounted in September when representatives from head-
quarters visited the laboratory to evaluate its rehearsal
for the finely orchestrated NACA Triennial Inspection.
The theme of the inspection was to be a celebration of
the tenth anniversary of the X-I, the first aircraft to fly
faster than the speed of sound. 4
Unlike the more specialized conference, NACA
Inspections were intended to convey the laboratory's
work to lay people, a group made up largely of politi-
cians and industry executives. At the "Stop," at the
new rocket test facility a staff member proudly showed
the NACA Executive Secretary, John Victory, the huge
new scrubber, part of the silencing and exhaust gas dis-
posal system. During the prepared talk, Victory bristled
when he heard references to space. Always on the look-
out for anything that might offend potential Congres-
sional sponsors, he ordered all references to space deleted
from the presentations. 5
The intended celebration of 10 years of supersonic
flight caught the NACA looking backwards. On Octo-
ber 4 the question of whether to discuss space-related
work was moot. Between the rehearsal and the actual
inspection, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik. Sudden-
ly Chuck Yaeger's dramatic breaking of the sound bar-
rier seemed like ancient history. Victory's earlier
resistance to references to space put the conservative
attitudes of headquarters in sharp relief. When the
inspection began several days later, Lewis engineers
could unveil with impunity their work on chemical roc-
kets and even more visionary space propulsion systems.
The presentations on high-energy rocket propellants
were the highlight of the inspection. Participants could
admire a liquid-hydrogen/liquid-oxygen rocket engine
capable of 20,000 pounds of thrust. After years of stub-
born advocacy, the lonely visionaries in the rocket
branch found themselves beseiged by their colleagues in
air-breathing propulsion systems for briefings on rocket
fundamentals.
The laboratoryreserveditsmost detailedconsidera-
tion of itswork in space propulsionfor the classified
NACA-Industry Conference,held the followingmonth.
Once again the rocket researchersheld center stage.
The presentationby John Sloop, A.S. Boksenbom, S.
Gordon, R.W. Graham, P.M. Ordin, and A.O. Tischler
discussedpropulsionrequirementsforspecificmissions,
includingsurface-to-surfacemissiles,Earth satellites,and
Moon missions.They consideredboth circumnavigation
of the Moon and an ambitious Moon landing, using an
orbiting Earth satellite as a base, probably the first
detailed discussion of a Moon landing in NACA-NASA
literature. Frank E. Rom, Eldon W. Sams, and
Robert E. Hyland's paper _Nuclear Rockets, _ and the
paper _Satellite and Space Propulsion Systems," by
W.C. Moeckel, L.V. Baldwin, R.E. English, B.
Lubarsky, and S.H. Maslen, were equally visionary. 6
Planning forLiquid Hydrogen Upper Stage Rockets
ShortlyafterNASA's formal creationinJuly 1958,
Silversteinsetup a committee to defineNASA's propul-
sion needs. By August thiscommittee had concluded
that, for launch vehiclesrequiring high-performance
upper stages,the liquid-hydrogen/liquid-oxygencombi-
nationappeared toshow the greatestpromise. The con-
sensusreached in thisNASA committee coincidedwith
the acceptance by the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA) ofa proposal by KrafftEhricke ofGen-
eralDynamics/Astronautics to develop a liquidhydro-
gen upper stagefor the Atlas missile.Pratt & Whitney
agreed to undertake the development of the RL-10
engine.In July 1959 theseprograms were transferredto
NASA. 7
In December 1959 Silversteinassembled a commit-
tee to evaluate the proposed Saturn vehicle. The
committee'sspecifichargewas todecideon the configu-
rationof the upper stagesforSaturn. To Silversteina
liquidhydrogen upper stageseemed particularlyattrac-
tivebecause itcould produce approxomately 40 percent
more payload per pound of lift-offweight than conven-
tionalpropellants.
ProjectBee had convinced Silversteinthathydrogen
could be used safely. Von Braun, however, did not
share Silverstein'sanguine view of hydrogen. In
Silverstein'sview:
The von Braun team was apparently willing to take
on the difficulties of the 15 million-pound thrust-
booster stage rather than the hazards which they
contemplated in the use of hydrogen as a fuel. The
Lewis team of NASA had pioneered in the use of
hydrogen oxygen and had operated small rocket
engines with hydrogen as a fuel for 10 years prior to
the time of the decision on Saturn. We had become
very accustomed to its use and its safety, s
Silverstein came to the meeting of the Saturn Eval-
uation Committee armed with data from a NASA study
on the feasibility of liquid hydrogen put together by
Eldon Hall, Adelbert O. Tischler, and Abe Hyatt. He
argued that conventional upper stages were too heavy
for the required payload. For a week the NACA team
and the yon Braun group debated, until von Braun at
lastcapitulated. _What led him to thisfinal decision,
I'llnever know, _ Silversteinremarked. He believedit
was neverthelessthe technicallycorrectdecision.This
decisiongave the United Statesthe edge over the Soviet
Union in the race to the Moon: "I believethat the
decisonto go with hydrogen-oxygen in the upper stages
of the Saturn V was the significantechnicaldecision
that enabled the United States to achieve the first
manned lunar landing. The Russian effortto accom-
plish this mission without high-energy stages was
doomed to failure."9
Afterthismeeting the development ofCentaur and
Saturn V became inextricablyintertwined.As an inter-
mediate step NASA intended to use the Atlas/Centaur
to launch Surveyor,an unmanned probe tosoftland on
the moon. Data from Surveyor was vitalfordetermin-
ing the composition of the Moon's surface prior to
landing human beings there. Centaur had the added
onus of proving the feasibilityof liquidhydrogen prior
to using itto power Saturn's upper stages.
Centaur and its Vicissitudes
In July 1960 the Centaur Program was assigned to
Marshall Space Flight Center where it languished in the
shadow of the Saturn project. By September 1962 it
was dangerously close to cancellation. Fortunately, at
that point Edgar Cortright, Deputy Director of the
Office of Space Sciences at NASA Headquarters, remem-
bered the keen interest in liquid hydrogen at Lewis
where he had spent the early part of his career. He
asked Silverstein, who had recently become Director of
Lewis Research Center, to come to Headquarters. He
discussed a letter that his boss, Homer D. Newell, had
received from Wernher yon Braun. Von Braun argued
thast NASA should cancel the Centaur Program. It is
not clear exactly why yon Braun resisted the use of
liquid hydrogen as a rocket fuel. According to John
Sloop who had a position at Headquarters during the
early NASA years, structural concerns were paramount.
To offset the low density of liquid hydrogen fuel, the
design of Centaur required bulky, thin-walled structures.
Sloop wrote:
The von Braun team simply did not trust Karl
Bossart's thin-wall, pressure-stabilized tanks first
used by General Dynamics for Atlas and then for
Centaur. Centaur had only a thin, common wall
dividing the fuel and oxidant tanks, and at one
time yon Braun came to Washington to push a
design change that separated the two tanks, a
change that would delay the stage development.
His request was denied by Robert Seamans. I
believe that these structure concerns outweighed
yon Braun's concerns about using liquid
hydrogen.l°
Von Braun recommended that the Saturn C-I/
Agena D launch vehiclereplaceCentaur. The Jet Pro-
pulsion Laboratory {JPL}, in charge of the Surveyor
Program since1960, concurred. Von Braun convinced
JPL that Centaur could not be devleoped intime to pro-
vide the necessaryknowledge ofthe Moon's surfaceprior
to the Apollo landing. In a letterto Newell, Brian
Sparks, Deputy Director of JPL, cited"the deplorable
situationinthe currentCentaur program" insupport of
cancellation.The development of a new space vehicle
fueledby liquidhydrogen required too much time. To
compete with the _doggedly determined effortof the
Soviets,_ the existingtechnologyofkerosene-basedfuels
had a greaterchance ofsuccess. He wrote:
The Officeof Manned Space Flighthas said that
data from a soft-landedSurveyor in 1964 or 1965
would be an invaluableaid in Apollo design,and
high-quality reconnaissance data from a lunar
Orbiterin 1966 isdesirableforApollo flightplan-
ning. These objectivescould be achieved on a
C-1/Agena D but not on Centaur in this time
scale.11
On May 8, 1962, 54 seconds after liftoff,the
Centaur portionof an Atlas-Centaur launch vehiclehad
exploded. Investigationrevealedthat an internalNASA
reporthad predictedthisfailure.Studiesindicatedthat
the insulationpanels could not withstand the antici-
pated pressureloads.
Moreover, three explosionsof engines on Pratt &
Whitney's teststands atitsResearch and Development
Center in Florida had resulted in both delay and
$1.2 millionworth ofdamage to the RL-10 engine. The
investigationconcluded that these were preventable
accidents.12
Differencesinengineeringbackgrounds and loyalties
between Marshall and General Dynamics had createdan
adversarialrelationship. In the view of historians
Richards and Powell:
A large part of the problem was due to conflict
between Marshall, with their Army origins and
main interest in the Saturn launcher family, and
the Convair [General Dynamics] and USAF manag-
ers with their Atlas background. The entire pro-
gramme came near to cancellation as initial
attempts to redesign the areas that failed in flight
led to such a large weight increase that the Sur-
veyor payload could no longer be carried. It was
only the absence of any alternative that saved the
programme, and a reserve plan to use a Titan 2
booster instead of the Atlas was suggested to
overcome the weight problem. 13
Centaur Comes to Lewis
In September 1962 the choice at Headquarters
appeared to be either to drop the Centaur program
entirely or find another NASA center willing to take
over its management. When Edgar Cortright asked
Silverstein if Lewis wanted the Centaur program,
Silverstein did not hesitate, even though project man-
agement on the scale of the Centaur program was new
to Lewis. In October MarshaU sent plane loads of boxes
containing books, drawings, spare parts lists, and
unsatisfied change orders. They were unceremoniously
dumped on the hanger apron at Lewis.
Silverstein asked David J. Gabriel, a Lakewood
native with a mechanical engineering degree from the
University of Akron, to take charge of the Centaur
Project Office with Cary Nettles as his Deputy.
E.F. Baehr, Jack Brun, Russel Dunbar, Elmo Farmer,
William Goette, Ed Jonash, John Quitter,
C.B. Wentworth, and R.A. Yaeger, all seasoned Lewis
staff, formed the core of the project. But Silverstein did
not limit Centaur participation to people with already
proven talent. Some of the new hires during the early
Apollo period cut their engineering teeth on Centaur's
many problems.
To strengthenthe hand ofLewis in technicalman-
agement ofthe projectSilversteinmade the former sub-
contractorsof General Dynamics, associatecontractors.
They reporteddirectlyto Lewis staffratherthan man-
agers at General Dynamics. An exception was the
development ofthe RL-10 engine which continued to be
supervisedby MarshaU (until1966 when thisprogram
was also moved to Lewis). Lewis engineers began to
develop strongtieswith Pratt & Whitney's designteam
in the early1960s. They collaboratedon the designof
the RL-10's injector.Pratt & Whitney engineersalso
used studieson regenerativecoolingcarriedout under
Robert Graham in the Cryogenic Heat Transfer
Section.14
Silversteinhimselfmade the key technicaldecision:
to initiallymake Centaur a singleburn mission. This
would simplifythe technicalproblems and save weight
untilthe launch vehiclewas operational.As originally
conceived by the team at General Dynamics, Centaur
was to have a multiple burn capability.After Centaur
was fired,itwould reach a parking orbit,shut down,
coast to a predetermined point in the orbit,then the
engineswould be relit.Silversteindecided to make the
earlylaunches of Centaur a directshot. That way the
coast phases could be eliminated.
There were many advantages to a direct shot. A
single burn would save weight because some of the
systems could be eliminated and the reliability of the
vehicle would be greatly enhanced. For example, in
order to assure that the pumps were cold enough to pre-
vent cavitation, they were chilled with liquid helium to
between 4-6 ° above absolute zero. By making the ini-
tial flights direct shots, the question of how much chill
down the second burn required could be deferred.
They could also put off the question how to manage
the slosh of the propellants in the tank. Before the first
burn, the tank is full and the vehicle is accelerating.
But in the parking orbit before the second burn, the pro-
pellants get hot and the gas has to be vented. If the
propellants are sloshing, liquid may get into the vent.
The question of baffles to dampen the slosh posed
another technical problem. Potentially, by simplifying
the mission, it could be accomplished in less time, since
so many new systems did not need to be designed.
Although the contractors for Centaur and
Surveyor--General Dynamics and Space Technology
Laboratories--were at first skeptical, they were cooper-
ative in helping to work out a new trajectory. With a
direct shot, the windows within which launches could
take place was far more limited, but nevertheless
feasible.
The Centaur team worked at a frenzied pace,
commuting to California to oversee work by General
Dynamics and to Cape Canaveral to prepare for
launches. The first several single burn missions demon-
strated correctness of Silverstein's approach culminating
in the flawless landing of Surveyor 1 on the Moon in
May 1966 and the transmission of the first TV pictures
of the Moon's surface. With each mission they were
able to solve new problems. In October 1966 they
achieved the tin'st restart of a liquid-hydrogen/liquid-
oxygen engine in space. Similar success with hydrogen
in the upper stages of the Saturn V proved yon Braun's
pessimistic attitude toward liquid hydrogen unjustified.
He autographed a picture of the launch of Apollo 4 on
November 9, 1967: "To Abe Silverstein whose pioneer-
ing work in liquid hydrogen technology paved the way
to today's sucesss." 15
The Centaur story also demonstrates the impor-
tance of technical leadership. Silverstein epitomized the
breed of engineer Arthur Squires has described as a
_maestro of technology'--someone who is thoroughly
familiar with the technology, who knows his staff well
enough to put together the right team for a specific task,
and who protects them from the aggravations of unnec-
essary bureaucracy. 16 No doubt Silverstein could be
gruff, tactless, and impatient with mediocrity, but his
engineering colleagues respected him and recognized his
leadership ability. In a New York Times interview, a
NASA colleague called Silverstein a genius--"not in
terms of invention and discovery but in his breadth of
comprehension of technical matters and his remarkable
facility for getting down to the fundamentals in any
field he tackles." 17
The winning combination of leadership, commit-
ment and teamwork was a product of Lewis's unique
engineering culture. Years of research experience with
liquid hydrogen had convinced Silverstein of its promise
as a rocket fuel. He had confidence that the team he
had assembled could overcome Centaur's many develop-
ment problems. Such was his personal commitment
to the program that it came to be regarded as
"Abe's Baby." The Centaur program provided valuable
hands-on engineering experience to recent engineering
graduates. To this day, staff who began at Lewis during
the early Apollo years, many of whom are now in upper
management positions, look back on the Centaur pro-
gram as a formative influence on their careers. The
Centaur program demonstrated the ability of the
laboratory to build on its research experience. The
center's management of a large-scale development pro-
gram succeeded because it had the winning combination
of people with knowledge, confidence, and most impor-
tantly leadership skills. Silverstein left as one of his
legacies a trained cadre of individuals who continue to
believe in the synergism between a strong research tradi-
tion and large-scale development projects.
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